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Changing Patterns of Conflict:
Di ssent to D enials of Revi ew in the Burger Court *
S. SIDNEY ULMER

University of Kentuc ky
WILLIAM

W. NICHOLLS , }R .

Texas Technological University

I nt1·od-uction
Research on the Supreme Court has given increased attention in recent
year to two propositions: the first is that the Court engages in a mu ltiplicity of
significant activities other than deciding plenary cases; 1 the second is that the
behavior of th e Court's justices is not a constant. 2 Both these propositions
have re levance for this paper.
By now , we are all familiar with the te levision portrayal of an American
Indian paddling a canoe down a river that becomes more and more polluted as
he moves along. Th e Indian is seen to embark near a heavily littered highway .
A bag of trash lands at his feet. A tear b·ickles slowly down his cheek. Then
comes the slogan: "Peop le start pollution. People can stop it." In analyzing the
subtleties of this message Paletz, Pearson and Willis suggest tha t by defining
th e environm ental problem as litter and placing the blame on the individual ,
eco nomic institutions and public officials are relieved of responsibility .3 The
anti-pollution fight beco mes an anti-litter fight which serve to disb·act attention from automobile emissions, smokestack debris, and non-returnab le bottles and cans.
In a similar vein, to focus on the plenary Supreme Court case - i.e ., those
cases that have bee n fully bri efed , orally argued, and decided with published
vote and writt en opinions - suggests to th e public and to students of the
Court that the significant work of that institution is to be found in such cases.
And that one may understand the role of th e Cour t in American life solely
through a study of these case . Th e work of other scho lars, howev er, suggests
that additional areas of a court's work may have great significance for th

* The

researc h on which this pap er i based was supported b y th e National Science Foundation ,
Grant #SOC 77-26066. An ear lier ver ion of th e pap er was pr ese nt ed at th e annual me eting of
th e Southern Politi cal Science Association , Atlanta , Georgia, November 9-11, 1978.
1 S. Sidn ey Ulmer, "Rese archin g th e Supreme Court in a Democrati c-Pluralist System : Some
Th oughts on New Dir ections," Law and Policy Quarterly , Vol. 1, #1 Uan. 1979), 53-80.
2 Ulmer, " Dim ensiona lity and Change in Judi cial Behavior" in J. Herndon (ed .) Math emati cal
App licatio ns in Politi cal Science - VJ/, University of Virginia Pr ess (1974) pp . 40-67.
3 David L. Paletz, Robert a E. Pearso n, Donald L. Willi s, Politics in Public Service Adoertisi,ig , Pra ege r Publishin g Co. (1978).

1

2

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

socio/political system in which the court functions .4 Th ese "oth er activities"
include summary decision making , dock et control, and th e whole panoply of
actions by which courts select cases for review. Under th e auspices of th e
NSF, the senior author of this pap er is currently engaged in a 2 year study of
the proc esses by which th e Supr eme Court constructs its annual agenda of
cases for pl enary consideration. Th e present paper reports some resea rch
done on a limited aspect of that general probl em - specifically, on access
decision conflicts. Th e long range purpos e of studying such conflicts is to
ascertain th eir possibl e impact on the selection of cases for review. Howev er ,
we do not get into that larg er qu estion in this pap er.
Th e second proposition regarding behavioral change is not absolutely new
or novel. But only in rece nt years hav e attempts to study chang e in th e
behavior of th e justi ces on a systematic or patt ern ed basis been und ertaken .5
To this point most stud ents of th e Court have emphasiz ed the consistency of
its decisions , wh ether for purpos es of stare decisis or th e psychological nee ds
of th e justices for personal consistency as arti culat ed by such th eories as
commitment, and cognitive dissonanc e. 6
Apart from psychological theory , th e judiciary itself frequently comments
on th e importance of stability in the law. Thus , writing in 1921, Cardozo
remarked: " ... the labor of judg es would be incr ease d almost to th e br eaking
point if every past decision could be reopened in eve ry case , and one could not
lay one 's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the cours es laid by
4 Joseph Tan enhau s et. al., "Th e Supreme Coul't's Certiorari Juri sdiction: Cue Theory " in G.
Schubert , Judi cial Decision Makin g, Free Pr ess (1962), pp . 111-132; Lawr ence Baum, "Policy
Goals in Judi cial Gatekeeping: A Proximity Model of Discretionary Juri sdiction," American
Journal of Political Science , Vol. 8 (1977), pp. 13-35; Ulmer , "Se lecting Cases for Suprem e Cou rt
Review: An Underdog Mode l," American Political Science Review, Vol. 72 (Sept. 1978) pp.
902-10, and sources cited therein ; and D oris M. L . Pr ovine, Case Selection in th e Uni ted States
Supreme Cou rt , (Ph .D . Th es is, Cornell University , August 1978).
5 For exampl e, see: Ulmer, "Th e Longitudinal Behavior of Hugo Lafayette Black: Parabolic
Support for Civil Libe rt ies, 1937-1971," Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 1 #1 , pp.
131-153; and Ulmer , "Para bolic Support of Civil Lib erty Claims: The Case of William 0.
Dou glas," j ournal of Poli.tics, Vol. 41, o. 2, pp. 634-639.
6 For such theories, cf. Carl I. Hovland e t. al. (eds. ) The Order of Presentation in Persuasion ,
Yale Unive rsity Press (1957), pp . 23-32; Charl es A. Kiesler, The Psychology of Commitmen t:
Experiments Linking Beha oior to Belief, Academic Press (1971). Similar psychological perspectives have bee n featured rece ntly in two papers authored by Burt on Atkins. Using a commitme nt
th eory framework Atkins examin ed th e work of Warren Bur ger compar ing his behavior as a D . C.
Circuit Court judge with his subsequent behavior in th e Suprem e Court. Atkins infers a high leve l
of consis te ncy between th e values arti culated by Burger in the lower cou rt and those str essed in
his Supreme Cour t op inions/vo tes. ("Chief Ju stice Burge r and the Criminal Offender in th e U.S.
Supreme Court : Or , th e Det 1·minis tic Source of Free Will Perspective." ) (Paper delivered at th e
Annual Meeting of th e Midw est Political Science Association , April 29-May 1, 1971, Chicago.)
("Th e Longitudinal Context of Judi cial Behavior : The Case of Ch ief Ju tice Warren Burger,"
1974, unpublished .) What is needed , howeve r, is an analysis of a number of justices with prior
serv ice on Cour ts of Appeals to d e term ine if Atkins ' findings regarding Bur ger rep rese nt gene ral
phenomena . Th e juni or au thor of this paper is cu rr ently engaged in such research as a dissertation
project at th e University of Kentucky.
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ot hers who had gone befor e him ." 7 But Cardo zo, unlik e some psychological
theorists, emphasiz ed th e nee d to change behavior on occasion - not in a
random or b·ansie nt mann er but a chang e in dire ction of decision consistent
with th e wishes of th e community. Thus , he added:" .. . when a rul e, after it
has bee n dul y tested by expe rience, has b ee n found to be inconsist ent with the
sense of justic e or with social welfare, th ere should be less hesitation in frank
disavowal and foll abandonment. ... If judg es have woefully misint erpret ed
th e mores of th eir day , or if th e mores of th eiTday are no longer thos e of ours,
th y ought not to tie, in helpl ess submission , th e hands of th eiTsuccessors. " 8
Th e resea rch we wish to report focuses on conflict over review decisions as
represented by diss en ts to denials of rev iew. 9 But it is concerned , at th e same
time , with chang e in those conflicts over time . We do not quarr el with
Cardozo s suggestion that change in mores is one cause of or justification for
change in judicial behavior. We b elieve , howeve r , that other changes in th e
Cou rt's envirnnm ent can lead to chang e in the behavior of th e justic es both in
deciding pl enary cases and in other d ecisional activities.

Conflict as a Function of Change in Gou.rt Composition
Like all decision making bodi es , th e U. S. Supr eme Court function s in an
enviro nm ent which imposes limiting conditions on its decisional pro cesses.
And like all decision making environm ent s, th ese conditions are subject to
chang e. It has long bee n conceded that a major limiting condition on the work
of th e Court is th e makeup of th e Court itself . As that mak eup changes, the
Court 's dec ision s at various leve ls are likely to be affected - certainly that is
the case if th e chang e in composition is of significant proportions and involv es
the exchang e of justices who are not id eologically fungibl e. 10
When a new Supr em e Court justic e is appointed, h e brings to th e Court
cer tain pr edi spositions . If , philosophically , the new justi ce is an exact copy of
the ju stice he replaces, th e id eological composition of th e Court remains
unchanged. How ever , that is unlik ely eve r to be th e case. In general, one may
as ume th at any change in th e composition of th e Court's mem hers introduc es
some chang e in ideological mix. Since it is well known that ideology influenc es
case deci ion , 11 it is not unr easonabl e to exp ect change in th e mix of ideologies
7 Benjamin Cardozo , The Nature of the Jud icial Process, New H aven: Yale
niversity Press ,
1921, p. 149.
8 Ibid., pp . 150-152. Should one think such a philosophy the ancient one of a long dead justice,
it may be noted that Cardozo 's words are quoted approving ly and used as a basis for decision by
Justic e Stevens as recently as 1976. (Runyan v. McCrory 965 S. Ct. 2603).
9 "dissents to d nials of review " as used here encompass dissents to denials of certi orari and to
dismissals of appeals. Although dismissal of an appea l may have precedential value it constitut es a
refusal to grant plenary review of a case and has the same effect as a denial of a writ of certiorari in
allowing the decision of the court immedia tely below to stand .
10 Stephen L. Wasby , Continuity and Change : From the Warren Court to the Burger Court ,
Pacific Palisades : Goodyear Publishing Co. (1976) and The Supreme Court in the Fecleraljudicia/
System, New York: Holt , Rinehart & Winston (1978).
11 Glendon Schubert , The Jud icial Mind Revisited , Honolulu: Unive rsity of H awaii (1974).
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in the Court to be associated with change in behavior patterns at the level of
the individual justice.
Historically, a president has been able to appoint a new justice to the Court
about once every 23.6 months. President ixon, on the other hand, appointed
four justices in three years. One would not be too surprised to find that
exchanging four members of a nine member group in such a short period of
time is disruptive - irrespective of ideology. But in this case the Nixon
appointees were chosen in such a way as to maximize the ideological disparities between the new appointees and the justices they replaced. These
disparities have been used to explain differences in plenary case voting
patterns between the Warren and Burger Courts. Our interest, however , is in
conflict patterns as represented by dis ents to denials of re iew and changes in
these patterns across the two Courts.
At least three possible kinds of change in conflict patterns may be investigated: (1) change in the extent to which cases involving dissent to denials of
review occur, (2) change in the conflict patterns exhibited by the Warren
Court justices and their replacements (Warren-Burger , Black-Blackmun ,
Harlan-Powell, and Fortas-Rehnquist ), and (3) change in the conflict behavior
of the "holdover justices" (Douglas, Brennan, Marshall , Stewart , and White ).
These three possibilities will be examined in the same order.
The data to be used consists of all cases in which dissents to denials of review
occurred in the 1964-68 and the 1972-76 terms inclusively. These are the five
terms preceding the appointment of the first ixon justice and the five terms
immediately following the seating of the last ixon justice. 12 Votes in the cases
and other appropriate data have been taken from U. S. Law Week.
Change in Conflict at the Level of the Court:
One obvious fact in comparing our two five term period is the dramatic
increase in the number of instances in which review was denied. The mean for
the first period was 2478 per term . But in the second period , the mean is 3500
cases per term. This tells us that a good many more litigants are being
disappointed by the Court in the Burger era. It reflects the fact that the Court
is limited (by time considerations ) to reviewing fully about 150 cases per term
while the number of applications for such review has increased from about
2000 per term in 1964 to about 4000 per term in 1976.
There is no particular reason to expect the increase in number of denial
cases to increase the rate at which conflict over denials occur - at least as
measurerd by dissent cases. In Table I , we present the 's for total number of
denial cases per term, the number of cases in which dissents to denial were
published , and the dissent cases as a percentage of denial cases. The table is
revealing. It shows that some variation occurred in the rate of dissent cases
12 S. Sidney Ulmer and John Stookey, " ixon's Legacy to the Supreme Court: A Statistical
Analysis," Florida State University Law Review , Vol. 3 (1975), pp . 331-1347 .

CHANGING

PATTERNS

OF CONFLICT

5

whether one looks at the ten year period or either of the five year spans. It is
clear , how ver, that the greatest variation occurred between the last term of
the Warren Court and the first term of the Burger era. A second dramatic
change in dissent rate is noticeable between the 1972, 1973, and 1974 terms
and the 1975, 1976 terms.
A second way of measuring conflict in the Court is to look at the number of
dissenting votes cast - term by term. Table Ia provides that information for
the ten terms. Again we see that the average rate of dissent voting is
dramatically greater in the 1972, 1973, and 1974 terms. But both tables
suggest that conflict was lower in the 1975 and 1976 terms than in any term
other than 1964. Reflection suggests two possible explanations for these
patterns. It is possibl e that the transition from the Warren to the Burger Court
was sufficiently h·auma tic to in rease conflict substantially in the early Burger
years but that conflict over case selection diminished after a "shake down "
period - i.e. , that the justices losing the s lection arguments in 1972, 1973
and 1974 either started to win th ese arguments in 1975 and 1976, or became
tired of the conh·oversies and acquiecsed in the "inevitable. "
A better explanation, however , is derived from the observation that the
drop off in 1975 coincided with th e departure of W. 0. Douglas from the
Court. 13 It so happens that Douglas was the most prolific dissenter to denials
of review the Court has ever seen. In Table II , we report the average number
of cases per term in which dissent to denial occurred and the average number
of dissents per justi .ce for each term of the Court. In general, Douglas
dissented in about 90% of the dissent cases. The next highest dissenter Marshall - is found dissenting in only 14% of the dissent cases. And Hugo
Black- the perennial cohort of Douglas -dissented
at a rate ofonly 13%. All
this suggests that the lumping of dissenting votes in the 1972, 1973, and 1974
terms might be attributable to Douglas . In fact, Douglas contributed 75
perc nt of the dissenting votes cast in the 1972 term. Comparable figur for
the 1973 and 1974 terms are 75 percent and 57 percent respectiv ely. If we
subtract th e Douglas votes from all t n terms , the figures become as porh·ayed
in Table III. If we perform the same surgery on Table I, we derive Table Illa.
Analysis of Tables III and Illa with a Mann-Whitn ey statistical mod el 14
reve als that with Douglas excluded, there is no signiflcant change in the
number of denial cases involving dissent. (U = 9 and p = .274) Thus , though
conflict as represented by dissent cases did increase in th e Burger Court, that
increase was solely a function of the dissatisfaction expres eel by Douglas
during his last three complete terms on the Court. For Tabl e III , however , U
= 3 and p = .028, we infer that even w.ithout Douglas , there was a significant
13

Douglas retired effective ovember 12, 1975.
Hub ert Blalock, Social Statistics , ew York: Harp er and Row (1960), pp. 197-203; Sidney
Siegel, 011-Paramet,ic StatisUcsfor the Behar;ioral Sciences, New York: McGraw- Hill, 1956, pp.
116-127.
14
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TABLE I. Conflict in the Court: Cases Involving Dissent to Denials of
Review
1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms

Term
# of Cases
in which
review denied
# of cases
involving
dissent to
denial
# of dissent
cases a %
of denials

1964 65

66

67

68

72

73

74

75

76

1974 2438 2638 2478 2860 3299 3347 3508 3713 3633

48 225 166 180 128 460 527 367 123 119

2.43 9.22 6.29 7.26 4.47 13.94 15.74 10.46 3.31 3.27

TABLE Ia. Conflict in the Court:

umber of Dissenting Votes to Denials of
Review
1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms

Tenn
Dis sent votes
in denial
cases
Average
dissent vo tes
per case

1964 65

66

67

68

72

73

74

75

76

63 250 263 256 18

518 673 549 233 223

.03

.15

.10

.09

.10

.06

.20

.15

.06

.06

change in the number of dissenting votes cast in denial cases between th e
Warren and Burg er Court periods. At th e same tim e, it is obvious that the
degree of change is not massive once Douglas is excluded and the lumping of
cases and otes in the 1972-74 terms is smoothed out con iderably .
Other evidence of change in conflict over denials of review can be found by
examining th e three areas of greatest conflict - Obscenity, Search and
Seizure , and Counsel. If the cases involving such issues in the ten terms
studied are broken clown for the Warren and Burger periods , we find that
conflict dimini~hecl in th e area of Counsel but increased dramatically in the
other two areas. Of twenty-eight Counsel cases in which dissent to denial
occurred, 17 or 61% occu 1Ted in the first period while 11 or 39% occurred in
the second. For Search and Seizure, on the other hand , 25 of 106cases (23.6%)
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TABLE II. Denial of Review Cases 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms: Average
Number of Dissents by Justice by Term*

Justice

1

2

½

# of dissents

# of terms**

Average # of dissents

231
1877
148
306
33
118
190
79
67
3
4
42
85
27
5
2343

7
9
5
10
5
10
10
5
4
1
5
5
5
5
2
10

Marshall .......
Douglas .......
.
Black ..........
Brennan ..... ..
Harlan .......
..
White . . . ... .. .
Stewart ........
Warren ........
Fortas . . . . . . . . .
Goldberg ... ' ..
Rehnquist . . ....
Powell .........
Blackmun .... . .
Burger .........
Stevens ........
Court ..........

33
208.6
29.6
30.6
6.6
11.8
19
15.8
16.7
3
.8
8.4
17
5.4
2.5
234.3

* Excludes justices with no dissents
** Includ es partial terms for some justic es

TABLE III. Conflicts in the Court: Number of Dissenting Votes to Denial of
Review, 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms -Excluding Votes by W.
0. Douglas

Tenn
Dissent votes
in denial
cases
Average
dissent votes
per case

1964

26

65

66

50 125

67

68

125 106

72
81

73

74

75

76

169 237 197 223

.013 .021 .047 .05044 .037 .024 .05049 .067 .053 .060

are found in the Warren era while 81 or 76.4 % are associated with the Burger
Court. And for Obscenity , the figures are 11 of87 or 12.6% in the first period
and 76 or 87.3% in th e 1972-76 terms inclusive. These figures suggest that
there is considerab ly greater disagreement in the Burger Court than in the
Warren Court over which cases to review in the areas of obscenity and search

8
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Conflicts in the Court: Number of Cases Involving Dissents to
Denials of Review 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms - Excluding
Cases in Which W. 0. Douglas was a Solo Dissenter

Tenn

1964 65

umber of
cases in
which
review
denied

1974 2438 2638

Number of
dissent
cases as
% of d nial

1.1

1.4

66

2.8

67

68

72

2478 2860 3299

3.8

2.6

1.6

73

74

75

76

3347 3508 3713 3633

2.7

3.2

2.7

3.2

and seizure. Br aking this data down by term , however , provides additional
perspective.
Table IV summarizes the data for cases on the appellate docket. The first
thing that catches the eye in Table IV is the dramatic drop in conflict o er
denials in Search and Seizure and Obscenity cases after the 1974 term. Since
this again coincides with th e retirement of Dou glas from the Court, one may
surmis that the Douglas resignation accounts for the diminishing conflict in
these areas . An examination of the Dou gla dissent in the 1973 and 1974
terms reveals that he dissented in 42 of 56 d nial cases in olving obscenity. At
the same time, however, Marshall dissented in 35 of the 42 cases. Thus, th e
retirement of Dou glas cannot account for the drop in conflict in such cases to
18 instances - in 16 of which Marshall found reaso n to dissent. As for searc h
and seizure, Douglas dissented in 53 such cases in the 1973 and 1974 terms, in
three of which Marshall dissented. In the 1975 and 1976 tenns, 1arshall
dissented in 2 of 5 such cases. Even so, the drop canno t be attribu ted to th e
Douglas retirement. It may be that the changes in conflict inferred are due to a
decrease in th e number of search/seizure and obscenity cases coming to the
Court in the 1975 and 1976 terms. Or perhaps , the Court began to take more
cases in the e areas in 1975. Unfortunate ly, the first supposition must wait for
evaluation until additional data from the larger research project are at hand.
As for th e second, the Court heard one obscenity and six search and seizure
cases in the 1975 term. Consequently , dissent to denial did not decrease as a
function of greater Court acquiescence in the dissenters point of view.
Change in Conflict as a Function of Change in Justices
The second possibility to be explored is that the exchange of the four ixon
justices - Burger Blackmun , Powell, and Rehnquist - for Warren , Black,
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TABLE IV. Cases Involving Dissent to Denial of Review in Three Selected
Areas: Appellate Docket , 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms Inclusive

Search and
Seizure Cases

Counsel Cases

Tenn
1964 .... . ...
65 ........
66 ........
67 .. ......
68 .. .. ....
72 .. . .....

73 . . ......
74 .. . .. ...
75 .. . .....
76 ........
Total ..... . .

0
7
2
6
2
0
7
1
1
2

1
4
7
6
7
18
42
16
3
2

28

106

Obscenity Cases
0
1
4
5

l
2
21
35
9
9
87

Harlan and Fortas - has caused conflict in the Court to increase or decrease .
We have at least one theoretical reason for choosing the direction of change
here - i.e. , for believing that the ixon justices would have greater control
over access to the Court than the justices they replaced. Thi expectation is
derived from the fact that the four appointees to the current Court were all
chosen by the same president in a relatively short time pan. The four
replaced justices , on the other hand , were selected by three different Presidents over widely dispersed intervals. Black was appointed in 1937, Warren in
1953, Harlan in 1955, and Fortas in 1965. Moreover , pe1formance in the
Court clearly differentiated Harlan from his three colleagues , though concededly to separate the other three from each other would require more
complex analysis.
TABLE V. Percentage Frequencies of Dissent in Cases Denied Review
1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms* by Selected Justices

Terms
Justices 1964

65

66

67

68

72

73

74

75

76

B1-Blm
Ha-Po

.77
.32

1.11
.18

2.01
.28

1.01
.41

.27
.12

.50
.11

.51
.19

.43
.32

.68
.41

.16

1.28

.76

.34

.00

.00

.00

.00

.00

.73

1.17

.84

.62

.00

.14

.17

.18

.22

.96
.00

Fo-Reh
Wa-Bu

.00

* Five terms for all justic es except Fortas
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TABLE Va. Mann-Whitney U Test of Data in Table V

justices

Ni

N2

u

Probability of
No Difference

Bl-Blm
Ha-Po

5
5

5
5

0
12

<.004
<.5

Fo-Reh

4

5

0

<.004

Wa-Bu

5

5

4.5

>.05

Table V summarizes the data relevant to our expectations, while Table Va
reports the result of a Mann-Whitney test. The analysis shows that the
exchange ofBlackmun for Black and Rehnquist for Fortas did produce significantly less conflict or dissent to denials of review - a finding consistent with
our expectations. The same hypothesis was not validated for the HarlanPowell exchange. For the Warren-Burger swap , no significant change in
conflict may be inferred from the statistical analysis. However , this appears to
be one of those instances when common sense would modify the statistical
results. It is obvious that i.fthe 1964 and 1972 terms are eliminated , change in
conflict may be inferred. Elimination of these terms, redoing the MannWhitney analysis, provides a U of Oand a p of .004. We believe - given the
dispersion of the data - that the best inference here is that conflict associated
with the Warren-Burger seat in the Court has decreased significantly in the
later period.

Change in Conflict Attributable to the "Holdover" justices:
Five justices - Marshall, Douglas, Brennan , Stewart, and White-served
in some or all of both the time periods studied in this paper. It is possible to
examine the conflict behavior of these justices across two courts. Assuming
Nixon's success in appointing ideological clones who stand in antithesis to the
justices they replaced, the ideological posture of the Court vis avis decisions
in plenary cases should be somewhat different from that of the Warr n Court.
Indeed , that proposition is already amply supported in the literature. 15 The
question is whether such a difference impacts on the selection of cases for
review and dissents to denials of review.
It is reported elsewhere that the appointment of the four Nixon justices is
associated with a significant increase in the dissent rates of Marshall , Douglas,
and Brennan in plenary cases. 16 The dissent rates of Stewart and White, on
the other hand, do not appear to have been impacted by the singing of the
Washy , 1976, op . cit.
S. Sidney Ulmer and William W. icholls , Jr. , "The Integration of Dissent Behavior in the
U.S . SupremeCourt ," Jurimetrics]ournal, Vol. 19 (1978). pp.173-178.
15

16
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Nixon quartet. Without going into the detail ed causes of such a differential
consequence , these facts provide a basis for sev eral hypotheses when viewed
against the finding that ideology influences behavior in disparate decisional
arenas of the Court. Other research has shown, for example, that the rate at
which a justice supports federal or state authority in plenar-y cases is highly
correlated with the rate at which he denies review of stat and federal
"victories" in the lower courts. 17 And a significant association has been found
between the vote of the ju tices in selecting cases for re iew and their votes on
the merits when the selected cases are reviewed. 18
If we characterize the completion of the ixon appointments to the Court as
N-4, we may offer three definitions and three hypotheses .
Defi nition l :
A holdover justice who increase the frequency of his dissents in cases fully
reviewe d on the merits subsequent to -4 is defined as an Upper.
Defi nition 2:
A holdover justice who decreases the frequency of his dissents in cases fully
r viewed on the merits subsequent to N-4 is defined as a Downer.
Defin ition 3:
A holdover justice who maintains the same frequency of dissent in cases
fully reviewed on the merits subsequent to N-4 is defined as a Homeostat.
Each of the definitions, D1-Da , has specific implications. To define one as
an Upper implies an inability to participate in the control of decisional outcome as frequently as before. For the Downer, one may infer greater participation. The Homeostat , on the other hand , may be thought to exhibit stable
behavior unaffected by -4. Since major change in Court personnel has b en
shown to impact on dissent rate in fully reviewed cases, an effect at other
levels of decision making may be anticipated. Stated in th form of hypotheses , the expectations deriv d from these considerations are as follows:
Hypothesis 1.
Uppers will increase , to a statistically significant degree , the frequency of
their dissents to denials of review subsequent to -4.
ypothesis 2:
Downers will decrease , to a statistically significant degree , the frequency of
their dissents to denials of review subsequent to -4.

fl

17
S. Sidney Ulmer, ··sup reme Court Justices as Strict and ot So Strict Constructionists:
Some Implications ,·· Law and Society Review. (Fall 1973), pp. 13-32.
18
S. Sidney Ulmer , "The Dec ision to Grant ertiorari as an Indication to Decision on the
Merits ," Polity , Vol. 4 (1972) pp . 439-447.
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Hypoth esis 3:
Homeostats will show no statistically significant variation in the frequency
of their dissents to denials of review subsequent to N-4 .
Table VI provides the data necessary for testing two of these hypotheses
with a Mann-Whitney U test. On the basis of Defmitions 1 and 3, Douglas ,
Brennan , and Marshall are correctly identified as Uppers in plenary cases.
Stewart and White , on the other hand , are Homeostats in such cases. Table VI
and Vla reveal that for Uppers , the disparities in dissents to denial ofreview
between the two periods (N 1 and 2) could have occurred by chance less than
one time in a hundred for Douglas , less than four times in a thousand for
Brennan , and less than five times in a hundred for Marshall. Hypothesis 1,
therefore , cannot be rejected.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that White and Stewart will not vary their dissent
frequencies significantly in denial cases since neither did so in cases decided
on the merits. Since the probability of the difference occurring by chance is
.111 for White , traditional standards prevent us from rejecting hypothesis 3 in
his case.
For Stewart , the situation differs . In denial cases , h e shows a significant
disparity (p. = .028) between 1 and N2. Thus , hypothesis 3 must be rejected
for Stewart.
The significance of these findings lies on several dimensions. For 4 of 5
justices (80%), our results constitute additional evidence for th proposition
that judicial behavior is integrated in a holistic sense - that the "causes" of
voting behavior in one decisional arena may operate to produce similar
behavior patterns in another decisional context. Specifically , the suggestion
here is that the factors that promote dissent at one d cisional I vel promote
similar di sent patterns at a second level. It should be noted that we do not
identify cau ative factors but they undoubtedly inhere in the differing outlooks of the justic sand the distribution of th s outlooks in the Warren and
Burger Courts. Thus , disagr ement of ajustic with tho e controlling decision
at either level may , via small group processes , make disagreement at the other
level more likely .
As for Stewart , the reasons why he does not conform to the prediction made
for him are not self evid nt. However, some fairly plausible speculations can
be offered. It may be that Stewart's behavior in the two kinds of cases is located
on two separate dimensions. It is also possible that rol conceptions are at
work. A dissent in a denial case , while published , is not as v.isible as one cast in
a plenary case. Stewart may ha e come to feel that dissents in fully reviewed
cases should be more restricted than dissents in denial cases. Or , perhaps ,
Stewart is lesi happy with the cases being selected for review but once
accepted finds himself influenced by the arguments of his majority colleagues
to a greater extent than when voting on appellate applications for re iew . After
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TABLE VI. Percentage Frequencies of Dissent in Denial of Review Cases,
U.S. Supreme Court, 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms, by Selected
Justices
Period 1
66
65

67

(N-4 )
68
72

73

Period 2
75
74

76

Justices

1964

Douglas
Brennan
Marshall

3.81 8.20 5.23 5.33 2.90 13.34 15.06 12.43
*
.10 .08 .34 .20 .31 .73 1.58 1.97 1.89 1.84
.32 .24 .55 1.37 1.68 1.51 1.24

Stewart
Whit e

000
000

.08
.29

.49

.69
.08 1.78

.31
.45

.48
.33

.78 1.62
.57 .57

.59
.54

.99
.69

• Du e to a low rat e of parti cipation , dissents for Douglas in his last term (partial) are not
considered .

TABLE Vla. Mann-Whitney U Test of Data in Table VI
N1

N2

u

p

3

0

<.018

Brennan

5
5

5

0

<.004

Marshall

2

5

0

<.047

Stewart
Whit e

5
5

5
5

3
6

<.028
< .111

Justi ce
Douglas

all, a good deal less time is spent in discussing jurisdictional applications and
explaining positions taken on them than in plenary cases .
It is theoretically possible that dissents to denials of review do not reflect
"tru e dissent" given an earlier role prescription against making such dissents
public. Several things can be said about such a possibility-though
we cannot
completely rule it out for all justices. In the first place , the same observation
can be made about dissents in plenary cases. Some dissents are repressed in
such cases. We do not know how many . Secondly, none of our five justices
thought it completely beyond the pale of proper behavior to publish a dissent
to a denial ofreview. All five did so in both the Warren and Burger periods.
Finally , if change in attitude toward publishing dissents explains the change
patterns we have revealed, then the dissents should increase randomly across
subj ect matter areas. This is simply not the case. While White decreased his
dissent rate in criminal cases significantly in the Burger Court period , Marshall, Brennan , and Stewart showed significant increases in dissents in such
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cases. Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart also wrote over 50 dissenting opinions
each in obscenity cases in the Burger era while writing not a single such
dissent in the Warren period. As for the remaining justice, he himself settles
the question for us. Writing in his autobiography, Douglas tells the following
story:
"When I came on the Court Hugo Black talked to me about his idea of
having every vote on every case made public. In cases taken and argued,
the vote of each justice was eventually known. But in cases where appeals
were dismissed out of hand or certiorari denied, no votes were recorded
publicly. I thought his idea an excellent one and backed it when he
proposed to the conference that it be adopted. But the requisite votes
were not available then or subsequently. As a result he and I started to
note our dissents from denials of certiorari and dismissals of appeals in
important cases. Gradually the practice spread to a few other justices; and
finally I ended up in the sixties noting my vote in all cases where
dismissals or denials were contrary to my convictions." (emphasis added)19
Assuming that Douglas is not prevaricating, we must conclude that the
increase in dissent to denials of review attributed to him in the five Burger
terms was not a result of any attitude change on his part respecting dissent
practices.

Summary and Condusions
Our investigation of conflict over denials of review in the Supreme Court
and changes in that conflict across the 1964-68 and 1972-76 terms must be
viewed as strict ly exploratory. Since very little is known about this area of
Court activity, we have felt justified in offering a good bit of descriptive data in
the paper along with some underdeveloped theoretical notions.
In general, our observations may be summarized as follows:
l. The Court is denying review to a much greater number of cases in the
Burger as compared to the Warren period.
2. As measured by total number of dissenting votes cast in denial cases,
conflict in the Burger Court was significantly above the level reached in the
Warren Court.
3. As measured by total number of denial cases in which dissent occurred,
19 W. 0. Douglas , Go East Young Man,
ew York: Random House (1974) p. 452. This is
somewhat ironic given Black's later defense of secrecy in the Court. But it is not incompatible with
his view that the sanctity of the Conference should be observed , or - as he put it-" . .. ifhe
(Karl Llewellyn ) meant by the remark you quoted that the Court 's conferences should be held
out in the public before radio or television , I disagree with him. " (Letter to th Senior Author ,
October 22, 1970).
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conflict in the Burger Court was significantly above that achieved in the
Warren Court.
4. The increase in denial cases accompanied by dissent in the Burger period
can be accounted for by the solo dissents of William 0. Douglas.
5. ln the most active area of dissent - obscenity cases - there was a
significantly greater degree of conflict over denials in the Burger period with
obvious clustering in the 1972-74 terms.
6. When Nixon justices are compared to the justices they replaced, signillcant change in conflict was observed for three of the four exchanges. In the
case of the Harlan-Powell exchang e, no significant variation was found. This is
consistent with other research indicating that Powell differs in some respects
from bis three brother appointees. 20
7. When th e holdover justices are compared to themselves across two
Courts, a change to greater conflict in the second Court was observed for 4 of
the 5. On th e basis of dissent patterns in plenary cases, such change was
predicted for 3 of th e 4. As predicted, no significant change was found for
Justice White. As for the missed prediction - Stewart - some speculative
explanations have been discussed. Overall , these results lend credence to the
views that: (1) the beha ior of the justices in the Supreme Court is sometimes
integrated across two decisional contexts, and (2) changing the ideological
compos ition of th e Court is likely to change the degree and patterns of conflict
among th e justices not only in plenary cases, but also in other decisional arenas
- especial ly that arena in which cases are being selected for plenary review.
20

Ulmer and Stookey, op. cit.

